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ABSTRACT
Emerging consensuses among growth economists view institutions as the key determinant of
improving  economic  growth.  This  study  examines  institutions  and  growth  performance  in
Nigeria. In order to obtain the aforementioned objective, we employed ARDL approach to co-
integration and Causality.  The findings of this study indicate long run relationships between
institutions  and economic growth. However, on the direction of the relationship the findings
suggest two –way causal relationship, which implies, economic growth and Institution causes
each other. The causal influence of economic growth on institutions reveals that despite, much
rhetoric to the contrary good institutions in Nigeria requires resources, which implies that poor
institutions are associated with having low income. The policy implication is that for Nigeria to
achieved better institutions emphasis must be given to critical growth driven sectors.
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 INTRODUCTION
The literature on institutional  approach to development stresses the importance of the
term “good institutions”. The term is generally described as the traditions and institutions which
explain how the authority is applied in a given country,  (Quibria, 2006). This understanding
emerged from the earlier  pioneering work of institutional  economists  such as Douglass  North
(1973) and  Mancur  and  Olson  (1965) the  findings  of  these  empirical  evidences  reached  the
conclusion that  there is  a positive  relationship  between institutional  structures  and economic
growth.  On the  basis  of  these  conclusion   there  is  wide believe  among  growth economists,
development specialists and international policy- makers that establishment of good institutions”
are necessary requirements for  achieving economic growth, North (1990), Zaum, Taxell,  and
Johnson (2012). Despite these plausible comparative literatures on institutional structures and
economic growth, the ongoing empirical evidences of institutions matter for development have
been marred with a number of shortcomings. Some of the empirical studies which purported to
showed  that  good  institution  is  important  for  economic  growth  have  suffered  a  number  of
shortcomings,  for  example,  measurement  error,  Keefer,  &  Knack,  (2006)  missing  variables
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, (2004), conceptual vagueness La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1999).
The  weakness  with  these  types  of  cross-sectional  regression  exercise  has  been
documented, by Quibria (2006) using a sample of East Asia countries. The author pointed out
that  these  types  of  cross-sectional  studies  have  failed  to  capture  the  nuances  of  interactions
between governance and economic growth. Qubria further elaborated that the failure is because
the governance measures were developed based on the implicit governance model which exists
only in institutions available in Western advanced countries. This argument is justified based on
the fact that some of the successful Asian developing economies did not do well in terms of
conventional governance scores, but, yet they are superstars when it comes to economic growth
performance. These economies created, in a matter of short span of time, a kind of growth and
development miracles hitherto which have never expected in human history. The conspicuous
example is China - today occupying the second most enviable fasted growing economy in the
World despite poor conventional governance scores.
 These curious arguments raised by Quibria, (2006) was rooted on the concerns of  Sachs,
Jeffrey,  John McArthur,  Guido Schmidt-Traub,  Margaret  Kruk,  Chandrika Bahadur,  Michael
Faye, and Gordon McCord (2004) in their studies on Understanding African poverty: Beyond the
Washington Consensus to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Approach. The authors
succinctly reveal that the reasons of African countries failing to grow are due to low income. In
other words economic growth in African requires resources.
This  paper  attempt  to  trickle  down,  this  general  argument  to  Nigeria.  The  study  of
Adogamhe, (2010), and, Sach et al (2004) focused much attention on the correlation. This study
is  interested  on  the  causal  relationship.  In  addition  this  study  try  to  determine  whether
institutions  are  a  preconditions  and necessary things  that  a  country must  have before  it  can
achieve  faster  economic  growth  at  it  early  stage  of  development.  Moreover,  the  studies  of
Adogamhe, (2010) and Sach et al (2004) focused on political institutions and found positive and
significant effects on economic growth. In contrast, this study is focusing on the validity of the
empirical  evidences  established  through  the  use  of  the  measures  of  institutions.  This  study
significantly differs from the previous studies by considering a time series data instead of cross
sectional  data  in  order  to  address  heterogeneity  of  a  country  specific  issues  and  context
specificity.  Indeed  addressing  context  specificity  through  a  time-series  matters  for  Nigeria
because  time  series  outcomes  may provide  better  understanding  than  cross-countries–section
research that combines countries together. 
Based on the above introduction, the remaining sections are structured as follows: part
two focuses on materials and method, while sections three present results and discussion, and last
part provides conclusion and policy recommendation.
 MATERIALS AND METHOD
Theoretically, the studies that examined qualities of institutions are attributed to the study
of  North  (1990).  This  study  was  among  the  early  studies  that  emphasized  on  the  role  of
institutions for an economy. This study was backed up by the work of Olsen, (2002 and De Soto
(2000)  ,  The  main  idea  behind  the  work  of  North  is  the  importance  of  public  and  private
institutions, as well as formal and informal institutions. The study included economic and social
as well as political factors that determine how an economy functions. In fact, the author went
further to describe institutions  as the set  of rules that  determine how a society behaves in a
particular  setting.   The  author  went  further  to  explain  that  institutions  encompass  taboos,
customs, and traditions as well as norms and values that hold the back bone of a society, and
extended the definition to include formal written constitutions and laws governing economic,
political, and social interactions in the society. 
North  (1990)  explained  that  the  configurations,  of  rules,  establishing  institutions
influence the incentives arrangement to which individual responds. Feeny, Hanna., & McEvoy,
(1996) and  Dollar, & Kraay, (2003) have argued that institutions change as the transaction costs
of  interaction  change.  This  is  more  obvious  as  the  economy  advances  and  technological
advancement also improves. Equally institutions change as the political and social forces within
a  society  change.  North  (1990)  Olsen,  (2002  and  De  Soto  (2000)  all  have  expressed  the
importance of property rights and contract enforcement in achieving economic growth. 
One of the good empirical studies which examined the relationship between institutions
and economic growth was conducted by the World Bank group of researchers Dollar, & Kraay,
(2003) .The findings of their study concluded that there is a bidirectional relationship between
quality of institutions and economic growth and the directions of influence is from institutions to
growth  Dollar, & Kraay, (2003)   and  Kaufman, (2012) examines the direction of influence
between governance and per capita income of 173 countries, using data of 300 indicators of
governance selected from a large number of cross-country studies for the years 1997-98. The
results of their study revealed that there is a significant positive relationship moving from good
governance  to  economic  growth.  Thomas,(2009),  Kaufmann,  Kraay,  &  Mastruzzi,  (2011).
Suggest  similar  conclusions  that  institutions  cause  economic  growth.  Other  important  case
studies  on  Nigeria  emphasizing  on the  role  of  institutions  includes  the  work of  Adogamhe,
(2010) Abdulai,  & Ndekugri,  (2008).  On the  reverse  causality  outcomes  is  attributed  to  the
works of Acemoglu, Johnson and. Robinson (2002), Olsen,  (2002 and  Rodrik,  (2010).
However, on the contrary, despite the proliferation of the above qualitative studies, there
is a serious skepticism on the validity of the claims that qualities of institution are necessary
preconditions for economic growth. This growing skepticism arises both from within and outside
the main stream of the heterodox economists.  The fact  remains  that  such types  of empirical
studies did not precisely explain how institution is  a necessary and precondition for growth,
rather than the reverse causality. For instance, Sach  et al (2004) demonstrated an econometric
analysis that standardized the measurement of institutions by level of income and found that; in
fact,  a  lot  of  African  countries  are  properly  governed  based  on  the  level  of  their  income,
therefore, concluded that such claim is doubtful. The general conclusion, within the context of
heterodox studies, is that it is economic growth that influences institutions by improving higher
income; this is clear in the case where growth was accompanied by greater need for higher good
institutions  (for  example,  desire  for  political  institutions,  with  greater  checks  and  balance).
Institutions are desirable things to have but not preconditions for development, they can only be
possess, after certain level of economic prosperity is attained (Aron, 2000)
Ignoring the important possibilities that good governance and quality of institutions may
require real resources constitutes the motivation of this study. These make it imperative to find
out whether poor institutions are associated with having low income in Nigeria.
Model Specification
This  study  utilizes  autoregressive  distributed  approach  to  co-  integration,  recently
developed by Pesaran, Shin, & Smith,  (2001) to overcome the difficulties of estimating time
series data and establishing the long run relationship among economic variables.  One of the
advantages  in  the application  of  ARDL approach to  co-  integration  is  that  it  overcomes  the
unnecessary difficulty of achieving the order of 1(0), and 1(1) as a condition of integrating order
of series. This approach appears to be more reliable when compared with Engle, & Granger,
(1987) and Phillips, & Hansen,(1990) approach. One interesting thing with ARDL model is that
it provides avenue for using OLS estimation criteria for identification and estimation of certain
variables  under consideration (Lee,  Pesaran,  & Smith,  1998).  The application of OLS in the
estimation of a long run relationship overcomes some of the weaknesses of other techniques.
Thus, ARDL provides means for detecting the direction of causality through the modified OLS
error correction representation mechanism However, the decision rules of establishing the long
run relationship in bound testing follow the rules that if the estimated F- test value of the joint
significance is higher than the upper critical value computed values, the null hypothesis of no
long run relationship is rejected. On the other hand, if the computed F- tests value of the joint
significance lays below the lower critical value, the null hypothesis of no long run relationship is
not rejected. But in any case where the F-test value falls in between the upper and lower critical
values the outcome result is inconclusive. In every step of ARDL selection, the lag order is very
important, therefore, the choice considers minimum lag value based on the Akaike Information
criteria, (AIC), or  the maximum  lags length based on Schwartz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC).
A diagnostic test is performed in order to make sure that the model is well specified and
it  is  free  from  any  forms  of  disturbances  or  instability.  The  stability  test  is  conducted  by
employing the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative
sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMsq). This enables us to be certain on the error
correction representation results. 
Model  specifications  are  as  follows:  First,  We  consider  the  standard  practice  in  the
literature following the work of Ono (2012), in this study the modified and specified model is
presented as follows: 
1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1nY InYt XEt BQt ERt Not LGt KKtβ β β β β β β β∆ Ι = 0 + 1 ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆ −
8 1 9 1 10 1 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 (1)InYt XEt BQt ERt Not LGt KKt etβ β β β β β β− + − + − + − + − + − + − + − −
The null hypothesis of no long run relationship is examined through F-test of the joint significant
of the lagged level coefficient of equation (1).
Ho: β8, β9, β10, β11, β12, β13, β13, β14, β15, β16=0 
Hi: β8҂0, β9҂0, β10҂0, β11҂0, β12҂0, β13҂0, β14҂0, β15҂0, β16҂0
Where   InYt  is the dependent variable,   XEt , , BQt   ERt ,   Not ,  LGt ,  KKt , are the log of
Accountable  executive,  Quality  of  the  bureaucracy,  strong  civic  society,  rule  of  law,
competitiveness of political  participation and control of corruption respectively,  and et is the
white noise term.
 Sources of Data
Data  on  GDP per  capita    Proxy as  InYt,  were  collected  from World  Development
Indicators, and the Central Bank of Nigeria annual statement of accounts various issues. Similar
Data on inequality of Income were obtained from the various National  Poverty Assessments
Survey,  various  issues.  Data  on  inequality  of  income  were  obtained  from Deininger  square
assembled data set on inequality of income for Nigeria.
Measurement of the indicators of governance is not an easy task, considering the abstracts nature
of the concepts, this made a large amount of these indicators, in principle, multi-dimensional.
Considering these multi  dimensionality of these indicators,  we follow the work of Keefer, &
Knack, (2006), Campos, & Nugent, (1999) and use different measures for each dimension of the
indicator.  Starting with Accountability of the Executive measure, the data were from the Gurrs
Polity 111 data set.  To measure the quality of Bureaucracy which is the second indicator  of
governance, in the model, the data was collected from ICRG data house and BERI data house.
The data on the rule law was collected from ICRG indicators. Data on Strong Civil liberties were
extracted from the Gastil (now called freedom house) indicators data set. Data on Competitive
Political  Participation  were  sourced  from Gurrs  Polity  111  data  set;  data  on  the  control  of
corruption were extracted from the transparency international and World Bank CPIA. 
.
Results and Discussion 
In table 1, the results indicate that after differencing all the variables are stationary at 5%
level  of  significance  implying  that  all  the series  are  co-integrated     and safe to  be use for
econometric estimation. However, from the result obtained in table 2, the estimated values of the
F- test  statistics  of  all  variables  in  the  model,  with exception  of  In XEt ,  have exceeded  the
computed upper critical value at 5% level of significance. As such the null hypothesis of no long
run relationship is rejected and also, since the estimated values of the F- test statistics does not
fall below the lower critical value.. This implies that in the long run all the series move together
toward stable equilibrium., 
 Table 3 presents the results of the estimated long run coefficient of the ARDL taken
economic growth as the dependent variable. From the estimated results, Control of corruption
appears with highest percentage, suggesting that any 1 percent changes in corruption in Nigeria
will causes 21.5% changes in economic growth. This implies high level of endemic corruption in
Nigeria. Accountable executive is statistically not significant; implying that it does not impacts
on economic growth. . The Rule of law is statistically not significant indicating that it does not
impacts on the level of economic growth. Competitive politics is statistically not significant;
meaning that it does not affect the economic growth in the long run. However, to determine the
direction of causation the dynamic error correction is estimated. The result is presented in table
4. Thus from the estimated results the    in the dynamic models of all the measures of institutions
the results provides interesting information. The ECM, which is the residuals of the long run
causal relationship, is statistically significant with negative values indicating a long run causal
relationship  between  measures  of  institutions  and  economic  growth.  One,  challenging
information about the results is the existence of a bi-directional causality relationship between
measures of institutions and   economic growth. Because in the economic growth model, growth
impacts on all the measures of institutions, while similarly, on the reverse case, the measures of
institutions  were found to impacts  on economic growth, this  findings seemingly paradoxical.
Because despite much rhetoric to the contrary, it is quite surprising that economic growth causes
good institutions. In other words Nigeria failing to grow May be attributed to the problem of low
income. These results seem quite consistent with the work of Keefer, & Knack, (2006), who
pointed  out  the  possibility  of  the  existence  of  two-  way causation  between  institutions  and
economic growth. The results  on a general note indicate  that  economic growth also changes
institutions. This study is entirely consistent with Khan, (2003 who suggested that when initial
incomes are taken into account (market improving) quality does not explain any significant part
of growth difference. Similar conclusion was reached by the   study of Sach et al (2004) who
extensively investigated the governance indicators and economic performance in Africa. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The primary purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between institutions
and economic growth. However, it was found that the direction of the causality remains to be
established  clearly  which  bears  important  implications  for  policy  design.  We  discussed  the
theory underpinning on the role of good institutions while developing the model and we test it
with plausible  arguments  using two methods  of  analysis.  First,  by using data  for the period
(1980-2011) with the sole aim of establishing the causal linkage among variables, the results
suggest that the direction of causality remain indeterminate; as such, issues related to causality
arising from these types of economic engagement need to be treated with caution. This study
wraps  up  with  some  important  policy  implications  for  the  Nigerian  government.  Nigerian
government must pay attentions to the governance capabilities that would enhance economic
growth,  so  that,  improved  economic  growth  would  lead  to  good  institutional  governance.
Because, institutional improvement such as democracy,  rule of law, anti-corruptions are very
expensive public goods and they can only be achieved after certain level of economic prosperity
is attained. However our finding does not resolve the intense dispute on the direction of the
relationship  between  governance  and  economic  growth.  A bigger  understanding  beyond  the
econometric data is necessary in order to figure out a clear understanding on the direction of the
relationship which may require historical lesson. This could be an area of further research. 
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Appendix
Table 1. The Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) test and Phillips Perron test for a Unit root
Variables ADF
Critical 
val. ADF
Critical 
Val. PP
Criticical 
Val. PP
Critical 
Val.
Level level first.Diff
first. 
Diff. level Level
first. 
Diff. level
InY -5.8258 3.661661 6.69156 2.967767 5.841001 2.960411 -32.241 -2.96397
InEX -5.5678
-3.66166 -6.6916 -
2.967767
-5.841001 -2.960411 -32.241 -2.96397
InBQ
-3.9863 -2.96041 -6.7587 -
2.967767
-3.959514 -2.960411 -19.548 -2.96972
InER
-4.6583 -2.98104 -6.942 -
2.963972
-2.997492 -2.960411 -7.4651 -2.96397
InNO
-2.3269 -2.96041 -8E+06 -
2.963972
-2.165423 -2.960411 -8.1006 -2.96397
InLG
-2.6707 -2.96041 -8.3162 -
2.963972
-2.639485 -2.960411 -14.706 -2.96397
InKK
-4.0272 -2.96041 -9.652 -
2.963972
-4.02723 -2.960411 -18.215 -2.96397
Note: * ** *** indicate significant at 1% 10% 5% respectively thus all variables are significant 
at 5% level of significant Sources: the table is computed by the researcher using
 Table 2. Bound test for the existence of a long-run relationship
Test statistics Significance 
level
Bound testing critical value with no 
trend
F- Statistics 1(0) 1(1)
InY 11.9212 1% 5.754        6.483
InEX 3.6511
InBQ 14.5386
InER 8.5994
InNO 21.1851
InLG 23.5460
InKK 16.3289
5%
10%
3.993
3.247
4.533
3.773
Note: The critical values are extracted from Narayan (2005b), case11model with intercept and 
trend, 
Table 3 Estimated Long Run Coefficient Taking Economic growth as a dependent variable
Regressors              Coefficient                                                          T-Ratio
InEX                                                          -1.3366                                                            -0.86872
 InBQ                                                            4.2032                                                            2.2337
 InER                                                            2.8094                                                               2.409
InNO                                                             1.5347                                                              1.0401
 InLG                                                         -0.0034831                                                       -0.44393
 InKK                                                             -21.4952                                                        -2.3042
Diagnostic test
Serial Correlation ᵪ2 (1) = 11.6032= (0.031), Functional Form ᵪ2 (1) = 2.5658 (0.109)
Normality ᵪ2 (1) = 3.7098 (0.156), Heteroscedasticty ᵪ2 (1) = 0.41224 (0.521)
These statistics are distributed as chi-square variants, based on the following tests:
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation.   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the 
square of the fitted values.   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
   D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted value
Table 4 Dynamic Error correction Models 
Regressors dInYt dInEXt dInBQt dInERt     dInNOt DInLGt DInKKt
dInYt
0
-
0.006589
0 0
(-
0.024628) (-4.3886)
-0.14321 (-0.23613)
dInEXt -
664.8581
-1.107 -0.020434 -0.25203 -0.21719
(-5.9948) (-6.1523) (-.65638) (-5.2584) (-6.5160)
dInBQt -11.1659 -312.343 -0.44724 -0.051542 -0.17804 -0.17031
(-4.3977) (-3.5152) (-5.4065) (-3.4582) (-12.8109) (-8.4933)
dInERt -24.8378 329.4836 -1.3815 -3.0362 -0.54949 -0.54949 -0.5784
(-1.4498) -4.5228 (-2.9263) (-4.3246) (-4.0124) (-4.0124) (-4.2401)
dInNOt -36.3609 129.1064 -2.3518 -4.9548 -0.77079 -0.88004
(-2.3006) -0.76597 (-5.2584) (-12.4578) (-6.4289) (-7.8361)
dInLGt -70.6329 302.332
2
-14.5971 -0.77079
(-4.7561) -2.1599  (-8.4933) (-6.4289)
dInKKt 23.9472 -1644.6 3.0689 3.0689
(.1.5667) (-5.9572) -4.0724 -4.0724
ECM(t-1)  -
0.66143
-15886 -0.66143 -15886 -0.51555 -1.8492
-2.27801
(-5.2971) (-3.2882) (-5.2971) (-3.2882) (-4.1019) (-16.2732) (-1.8417)
ARDL(1,1,0,1,0,0,1,1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
Figure 1 Economic growth as dependent variable
 Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
 The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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